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Non-technical summary. In the post-Paris political landscape, the relationship between sci-
ence and politics is changing. We discuss what this means for the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), using recent controversies over negative emissions technologies
(NETs) as a window into the fraught politics of producing policy-relevant pathways and
scenarios. We suggest that pathways and scenarios have a ‘world-making’ power, potentially
shaping the world in their own image and creating new political realities. Assessment bodies
like the IPCC need to reflect on this power, and the implications of changing political
contexts, in new ways.
Technical summary. Following the adoption of the Paris Agreement of December 2015, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has begun to reconsider its role in the
climate regime. Based on work in Science and Technology Studies (STS), we reconstruct
how the IPCC has historically positioned itself between climate science and policy-making.
We then discuss particular challenges raised if the IPCC is shifting along the spectrum
from attributing causes and detecting impacts of global warming towards projecting policy
solutions, including emerging technologies, by examining recent controversies over negative
emissions technologies (NETs). We conclude that the IPCC exercises a ‘world-making’
power by providing new, politically powerful visions of actionable futures, for example,
based on speculative technologies of bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS).
The task of providing future pathways poses great challenges to conventional ideals of scien-
tific neutrality. We argue that the growing political demand for pathways, and their political
significance, requires rethinking modes of assessment that go beyond expert-driven neutral
input. Assessment processes must take into account their political contexts and implications
in a systematic way.
1. Introduction
Following the adoption of the Paris Agreement of December 2015, all parties are obliged to
offer proposals of concrete contributions to the climate change mitigation challenge. There
have been concerted calls for the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to
reconsider its role in a new global climate policy regime shaped around the national imple-
mentation – and international monitoring – of highly heterogeneous, domestically-determined
mitigation policies. The IPCC’s new leadership has called for a focus on climate solutions to
support the Paris Agreement, including an anticipated Special Report on the impacts of 1.5 °C
of warming (IPCC Special Report [SR]1.5) (p.xi [1]).
We are arguably on the cusp of a fundamental re-alignment of the relationship between
international climate science and policy, crystallizing the move from climate science as a herald
of societal problems and an advocate of political action, to a ‘solution- and future-oriented’,
regulatory science. This paper, based on a meta-assessment of the scientific literature on the
IPCC as a boundary organization operating at the interface between climate science and inter-
national decision-making, considers some of the implications of this move [1–3].
We examine some of the challenges that may arise from what we call the politics of antici-
pation. This is when science is asked to project and evaluate the performance of policies in the
future. We discuss particular challenges raised if the IPCC is now shifting along the spectrum
from cause and impacts into future solutions by examining recent controversies over the inclu-
sion of negative emissions technologies (NETs) in posited pathways of climate change.
The NETs case exemplifies some of the challenges that may emerge from the politics of antici-
pation, including the assessment of emerging technologies. In particular, we focus on why,
how and with what consequences the IPCC will perform this novel task, particularly concern-
ing questions of the IPCC’s mandate of providing ‘policy relevant but not-prescriptive’ assess-
ments. Our analysis is informed by perspectives from Science and Technology Studies (STS),
which encourage consideration of responsibility for institutions’ own role in the wider politics
of global environmental change.
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2. Approach: a co-productionist framework
In the section that follows we elaborate on these perspectives
[1–3] before looking more closely at the IPCC’s own role in the
global politics of climate change.
The challenges the IPCC faces after the Paris agreement are
neither novel nor unique, but have already been discussed under
categories such as ‘regulatory science’ [4], ‘anticipatory govern-
ance’ [5] or ‘responsible research and innovation’ [6]. Scientific
claims about the future are political interventions, defining polit-
ical choices about future options for action and thus influencing
the often irreversible path of societal developments.
The ideal of political neutrality in scientific advisory and
assessment processes has a particular history and serves as an
important principle, shaping the public performance of scientific
communities. Scientific neutrality is not just about protecting
the ‘republic of science’ from the corrupting forces of outside
influences [7]. It is an ideal built into the constitution of liberal
democracies, serving both science and politics. Science offers a
“politically attractive strategy for defining, observing and evaluat-
ing the effectiveness or the instrumental adequacy of actions inde-
pendently of the subjective traits of actors” (p. 33 [8]).
However, historians and sociologists of science have shown
how this powerful ideal of scientific neutrality has to be constantly
renegotiated in practice as the political roles of science and cul-
tures of scientific knowledge making continuously change. The
concept of ‘boundary work’ was introduced [9] to describe the
social practices by which distinctions are drawn between legitim-
ate and illegitimate knowledges, and by which certain actors are
admitted into expert collectives [3,10,11]. In ‘boundary organiza-
tions’ like the IPCC, the constant negotiation of the science–
politics boundary is a crucial feature, performed through practices
of boundary work including choices about rules of membership
for an expert organization, its lines of accountability to scientific
and political communities, the standards by which it defines
evidence, and its procedures for review and approval [2,4].
STS scholarship has developed the concept of co-production as
an analytic concept to understand the political power and impli-
cations of knowledge production (p. 37 [12]). It is based on the
assumption that there are intrinsic links between ways of repre-
senting a phenomenon on the one hand, and ways of acting upon
it, so as to transform it, on the other [12]. Assessments deliver
both a description of the world, and a set of tacit prescriptions for
how that world should be rationally managed. In this way, the
definition of a problem – the causes and impacts of global warm-
ing – and the search for appropriate ways to respond – are reitera-
tive and mutually reinforcing. STS scholarship has helped to show
how forms of knowledge-making do not only offer policy-makers
useful information, but perform a ‘world-making’ function of
furnishing policy-makers with the objects, variables and relations
upon which they seek to exert influence [4]. With this lens,
authoritative science may not just be a neutral input into policy,
instrumentally informing policy decisions, but a set of performa-
tive and reiterative practices that frame and transform the social
relationships, political norms and cultural values they seek to
represent [2,5,12].
What is of interest here is the performativity of scientific
assessment – that is, the ability of particular descriptions of the
world to act upon, transform or bring into being the objects
they describe, not just through the direct informing of policy deci-
sions, but through the wider conditioning of the world according
to authoritative scientific descriptions of it. Here we draw on
lessons learned from the literature on imaginaries [13] and the
sociology of the future [14,15] to explain why any knowledge
about the future, especially knowledge that emanates from
authoritative institutions such as the IPCC, can be performative.
In order to account for the politics of anticipation, we take into
account particular challenges raised by the assessment of emer-
ging technologies such as bioenergy with carbon capture and stor-
age (BECCS). The pathways that keep global warming within
Paris Agreement limits rely on the application of NETs to remove
CO2 from the air on a large scale. NETs fill the gap between emis-
sions reduction commitments and the level of ambition required
for an emissions pathway consistent with staying below a 2 °C,
let alone a 1.5 °C, temperature increase. NETs, however, are
speculative in the sense that most of their proposals only emerge
from artificial renderings and exist within the parameters of
Integrated Assessment Models (IAM). IAMs use BECCS because
of ‘hoteling’ and ‘backstops’. This basically means that if the car-
bon price becomes high enough, there will always be a cheaper
technological solution [16]. At the same time, NETs are not yet
available at the extent and scale calculated by these models
[17,18]. The IAMs now routinely integrate the (highly specula-
tive) assumptions that NETs will be available by the latter part
of the 21st century and that they are able to remove more CO2
from the atmosphere than that added [19,20]. Attempts to deploy
NETs at large scales, however, involve significant uncertainties
regarding the extent of the CO2 removal which could be achieved,
economic costs and likely major impacts on terrestrial or marine
ecosystems [21]. The dominant role assigned in IAMs to NETs (in
particular BECCS) faces serious challenges in taking fully into
account the magnitude and duration of possible temporary excee-
dance of temperature targets, interactions between NETs (such as
BECCS, afforestation and reforestation) and their competition for
scarce resource such as land, as well as allowing for factors that
potentially may reduce or even reverse CO2 removal (CDR) cap-
acity. This adds further uncertainties to the calculation of the
cumulative potential in integrated assessment [21,22].
In light of the approaches described above, we explore why
scientific projections such as the IPCC pathways not only project
visions about technological and economic capabilities into the
future, but also (and often implicitly) expectations and images of
social order; they constitute ‘sociotechnical imaginaries’ [13] that
shape society independently of whether the promises of the tech-
nologies at their core are actually fulfilled [18,23]. We apply this
lens to demonstrate that the IPCC is one key institutional site where
the expert imagining(s) of climate futures is communally adopted
and thus transformed into a collectively held (canonical) vision
of our collective future. The way the IPCC generates and adopts
particular expert imagining(s) of futures indicates their performa-
tive power – their transformation from purely speculative visions
into politically powerful visions of actionable futures [24].
It is the recognition of this performative power of science,
and particularly of scientific projections of the future, that has
led many to rethink the role and responsibilities of scientific insti-
tutions not in spite of their scientific neutrality, but because of
science’s political impacts and implications [1,2,5,15,17,18].
3. IPCC strategies for performing the neutral arbiter
The IPCC is widely considered to be the most significant environ-
mental boundary organization [25]. In this section we illustrate
how the IPCC’s role as a key boundary organization is guided
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by the principle of performing the role of neutral arbiter, made
clear in part through its attempt to maintain a clear separation
between science and politics.
3.1. Setting the boundary: policy relevant but not-prescriptive
During its first assessment cycle (1988–1990), the IPCC already
operated in a ‘solution-oriented’ mode. Alongside what became
its regular scientific assessment tasks, it also performed the role,
in the nascent Working Group III, of assessing existing legal instru-
ments and additional elements of an international framework con-
vention in the run-up to the Rio Earth Summit [26]. In doing so it
laid out the bare bones of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which was adopted
at Rio in 1992. The IPCC was serving as the main forum in
which early political negotiations were taking place at this time
[27]. The political task – in addition to the intergovernmental
status – was seen as a threat for the scientific credibility of the entire
organization, while developing countries expressed concerns that
the close coupling of science and politics would leave them, with
their lower scientific capacities, with less political influence
[25,27]. As a response, the IPCC decided in 1990: “The work of
the organization is […] policy-relevant and yet policy-neutral,
never policy-prescriptive” [28], and the task of deliberating over
policy instruments was delegated to a new Intergovernmental
Negotiating Committee. Most notably, IPCC representatives con-
tended that the strategy to provide a politically neutral assessment
based on scientific rigor and consensus was the only way the body
could preserve its scientific credibility [28,29]. When the IPCC
withdrew from providing policy recommendations in 1990, the div-
ision of tasks between the IPCC and governments was reorganized
in order to maintain a strict demarcation between scientific assess-
ment and political negotiation. This move was the first of many by
which the IPCC has re-ordered its internal boundaries in order to
maintain a firm external distinction between science and politics,
and to reconcile policy relevance with political neutrality. In an
STS perspective, these strategies can be understood as forms of
boundary work that – whether intentional or not – serve to main-
tain the stability of the boundary between science and policy-
making. Scientific assessment is supposed to be independent of pol-
itical values and interests and thus able to serve as a neutral arbiter
or harmonizing force in politics (see [30,31]).
4. Making futures
Against this background we turn to a more recent case, which we
believe to be instructive in thinking, in an anticipatory mode,
about the likely complexities of solution-oriented assessment.
4.1. From emissions scenarios to representative pathways
Prior to 2007, the IPCC’s Special Report on Emissions Scenarios
(SRES) presented the main scenarios underpinning assessments
of future climate trajectories. They were “plausible alternative
futures”; storylines of future socio-economic and demographic
changes and associated changes in greenhouse gas (GHG) emis-
sions (p. 24 [32]). Crucially, they did not include ‘climate policy’
as such, but rather were representations of possible social trends,
such as accelerating industrialization or economic localization.
Towards the end of the production of IPCC Fourth Assessment
Report: Climate Change 2007 (AR4) it was agreed that a new
set of climate change scenarios should be produced to inform
subsequent assessments. However, it was decided that the scen-
arios should not be produced by the IPCC itself, as with the
SRES (IPCC 2000), but rather that the IPCC should commission
the IAM community to produce scenarios along certain lines
(25th Session, April 2006). This was thought important in main-
taining a distinction between scenario development and assess-
ment, and thus to maintaining the IPCC’s independence as an
assessor, rather than a producer, of knowledge.
An expert meeting in September 2007 fleshed out plans for a
new methodology of scenario production. The new aim was to
expedite the production of socio-economic scenarios and climate
projections by identifying a set of pathways describing the evolu-
tion of atmospheric GHG concentrations and radiative forcing
levels over time. Such pathways could then be given to the IAM
and general circulation model (GCM) communities for the subse-
quent production of socio-economic scenarios and climate pro-
jections. In the past, scenarios were produced by the IPCC and
the IAM community, before being fed into GCMs to produce pro-
jections of climate change and its impacts.
The Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP) essentially
switched round this order of input and output, removing the pri-
mary focus on social change and replacing it with a focus on a
physical variable – radiative forcing – and on the end point of cli-
matic change (radiative forcing levels in 2100), rather than plotting
a path forwards from the present [33]. The RCPs would provide a
set of end points against which climate policy options could be
assessed for their effects on the likelihood of reaching certain end
points. The pathways selected would be representative of the litera-
ture from the burgeoning field of integrated assessment modelling,
but would make no “judgment as to their desirability” (p. 43 [34]).
The boundary between description and prescription was how-
ever immediately difficult to negotiate, and particular controversy
emerged over the selection of a low radiative forcing pathway.
Participants of the expert meeting reported demand from both
the scientific and policy community for a low-emission pathway
[35], but the decision to select either a 2.9 or 2.6 W/m2 pathway
proved controversial (p. xix [36]). In 2007, a 2.6 pathway had only
been produced by one modelling group [37], so perhaps couldn’t
be considered ‘representative’ of the literature. However, an inter-
vention by Malte Meinshausen, Bill Hare and others at the meet-
ing argued that it would be ‘policy prescriptive’ to exclude the 2.6
pathway from the set, as that would essentially exclude that future,
and its associated policy options, from scientific assessment
and political consideration. An IPCC meeting agreed that the
Panel’s decision to produce scenarios representative of the ‘full
range’ of the literature meant that 2.6 had to be considered, but
serious doubts abounded, including from the pathway’s origina-
tors, about the technical feasibility of what was seen as an essen-
tially ‘exploratory’ piece of modelling [34].
A special committee was therefore formed to investigate the
technical feasibility and replicability of the 2.6 scenario. The com-
mittee scrutinized the “technical soundness” of the 2.6 pathway,
checking it for “sound assumptions, logic, and associated calcula-
tions” (p. xi [34]).
Meanwhile, the modelling team responsible for the 2.6 scen-
arios also went away to further scrutinize their assumptions and
results, particularly those pertaining to the differences between
the 2.9 and 2.6 pathways, in particular, BECCS.i Both pathways
iThere is an important distinction between the capacity of outside actors to scrutinize a
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assumed demanding levels of emissions reductions over the next
few decades. The 2.6 pathway followed this with a massive roll-out
of BECCS to pull the radiative forcing level down even further by
giving large expanses of land over to growing fuel crops, which
would draw down carbon, and then capturing and burying this
carbon when burned [21,40]. The requisite technologies to
remove carbon from the atmosphere were then, and largely still
are, untested at the scale and rate of deployment envisaged by
the IPCC scenarios [21] but the pathways met the committee’s
criteria of internal logic and calculative robustness, despite the
pathways making a large number of (quite openly acknowledged)
critical assumptions about technical innovation, institutional
change, and political acceptability (see [41]).
Reproducibility was a further desired trait, and while the panel
was considering the technical soundness of the 2.6 pathway, an
EU-funded project saw the two main European IAM teams
invited to produce 2.6 pathways “with which they were comfort-
able” (p. 5 [42]). This they did, as did two other IAM groups.
Together, all four replication scenarios included, as the committee
put it, “critical assumptions about energy technology and institu-
tional requirements that will be very challenging to achieve” (p. 5
[42]), particularly regarding BECCS, which was central in all the
model runs achieving the 2.6 W/m2 end point. Nonetheless, the
criteria of internal logic, technical soundness and reproducibility
had been met, and the 2.6 pathway was recommended as a mem-
ber of the new RCP family.
The episode provides further illustration of how the IPCC has
maintained the external-facing boundaries between relevance,
neutrality and prescription through a series of internal
re-organizations and boundary work; in this case, at the level of
institutional design, the effort to separate scenario development
from assessment, and arguably to position a physical variable
(radiative forcing) as the starting point of scenario development,
rather than social variables and futures. At the level of practice,
the decision to include such a low stabilization pathway was influ-
enced by policy-maker interest, not least from the EU which was
actively asking new questions of the IAM community [35], but the
decision in favour of 2.6 rather than 2.9 was arguably not just
about avoiding prescriptiveness (‘do this’), but about policy per-
formativity – that is, concerns about the role of scientific assess-
ments in defining the possibility space within which political
actors can deliberate and make decisions (see also [43]). The
SRES-RCP shift arguably created the space for more speculative
technological futures to find their way into officially authorized
scenarios – a technology like BECCS perhaps would not have
been included in the SRES scenarios (had it been imagined at
that time) given the SRES emphasis on social plausibility. The
move to the RCP methodology, which was partly a strategy of fur-
ther distancing the IPCC from the messy business of socio-
economic scenario building, arguably and paradoxically facilitated
the construction of futures that were both more speculative and
politically charged than the SRES scenarios. Technical feasibility
and experimental reproducibility replaced social plausibility as
the key criteria for formally sanctioning certain constructions of
the future. The idea of negative emissions and technologically
afforded overshoot and respite is beginning to affect policy discus-
sions in concrete terms, even if these technologies are still highly
speculative. The politically adopted 2 °C target likely already
assumes overshoot in atmospheric carbon followed by a draw-
down (p. xix [35]). The implicit – but scientifically contested –
assumption of the availability of huge negative emissions tech-
nologies has led to renewed questioning of the processes by
which political demands and funding can drive scientific expertise
toward speculative assumptions (p. 68 [15]).
In the next section, we examine what happened to this particu-
lar future construction as it began to circulate around and exert
agency in the policy world.
4.2. From a matter of fact to a fact that matters: the political
impacts of RCP2.6
The RCP2.6 pathway held huge political significance, as it
appeared to demonstrate the continuing feasibility of the world
meeting the 2 °C target as a ‘matter of fact.’ RCP2.6 therefore
quickly became a ‘fact that matters’. By providing evidence that
the world might manage to limit warming to 2 °C, RCP2.6 had
a significant impact on political negotiations. The IPCC’s identi-
fication of a possible pathway to 2 °C can be considered per-
formative in itself, in the sense that it has enabled transactions
that it claims only to describe. The 2015 Paris Agreement to
hold global temperate rise to “well below 2 °C” [44] was informed
by scientific evidence for the continued technical feasibility of
2 °C, even as analyses continued to show that meeting the target
would be extremely difficult [41,45]. This created an interesting
slippage between a ‘possible’ pathway and a political reality –
the pathway has informed and justified political aspirations to a
certain end, while also becoming a policy option in terms of
both ends and means, thereby bringing new topics, such as
BECCS, into political debate as future political options to achieve
the Paris ambition. The IPCC’s RCP2.6 created new political facts,
such that ambitious mitigation targets cannot seemingly be
achieved without NETs. IAMs in general and RCPs in particular
have served to make the pathway politically legible and actionable.
The heavy reliance of RCP2.6 on BECCS has nonetheless been
a source of great controversy since the Paris Agreement was signed.
The BECCS element of the pathway depends on a rapid deploy-
ment on a truly massive scale of a technology currently in its
early deployment stage, while the construction of areas of the tro-
pics as simple sinks for global carbon has caused controversy in the
past [2] and is already doing so again [46]. Even if it is possible in
purely technical terms to grow huge quantities of biomass or cap-
ture and store huge amounts of carbon, then biophysical, biogeo-
chemical (i.e. nutrients), ecological, energy, water and economic
resource implications of large-scale implementation of NETs differ
significantly. Such factors need to be taken fully into account in
any realistic assessment of the potential of NETs; a point well
recognized by other authors [21,19,41]. This has led to criticisms
that integrated assessors/modellers have been insufficiently open
about the assumptions contained in the RCP2.6 scenarios, or
that details have been lost in translation [20,45,47]. The reliance
on NETs in the scientific foundation of policy-making has been
questioned, because NETs’ future contributions to CO2 removal,
and thus to meeting Paris targets, appear ‘optimistic’ on the basis
of current knowledge (p.19 [21]). The European Academies’
Science Advisory Council (EASAC) concludes: NETs should not
“form the basis of developing, analyzing, and comparing scenarios
of longer-term energy pathways for the EU” [21].
We might say that the IPCC performed an important legitim-
ating function for the speculative technology of BECCS, pulling it
into the political world, making previously unthinkable notions –
such as overshoot and negative emissions – more mainstream and
acceptable, as well as perhaps pushing it ahead of policy options
(such as radical mitigation) in political calculations, and thus rais-
ing new questions about the neutrality of climate science.
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The NETs example indicates that the IPCC will increasingly
face difficult questions over how to handle the assessment of
such speculative and controversial ‘solutions’ to climate change.
5. From neutral to responsible assessment
In the concluding sections, we argue that a turn towards solution-
oriented assessment may necessitate a reconsideration of the prin-
ciples that have heretofore guided scientific assessments of climate
change.
The preceding discussion has emphasized how the develop-
ment of the IPCC’s design choices and assessment practices can
be read as a history of efforts to maintain the IPCC’s policy-
neutrality and policy-relevance. Maintaining the stability of the
external boundary between international climate science and
policy-making has been achieved through a series of internal
readjustments and reorganizations, for example, through the
early withdrawal from political functions and the emergence of
new scenario methodologies. The latter has given rise to a con-
troversial situation in which questions of technical feasibility of
certain pathways have been given primary consideration over
questions of their societal or political desirability in the construc-
tion of actionable futures. This is instructive for thinking about
the politics of neutral assessment, as it demonstrates how a nar-
row scientific focus can be instrumental in controlling potential
futures. The narrow focus and IPCC’s reluctance to openly address
the political implications of its findings were criticized when it
came to approval of the WG III Summary for Policy-makers during
AR5: as Victor suggests, it contributed to masking major political
implications in terms of costs, as well as winners and losers [48].
In the same spirit, Anderson argues that climate scientists have
been unwilling to address and communicate “the revolutionary
implications” of their scientific results [20].
STS research shows that knowledge-making about future path-
ways is never neutral, but is instead inescapably political. We have
argued that IPCC pathways exercise a world-making power by
providing new, politically powerful visions of actionable futures.
With this world-making power in mind, we would suggest that
the IPCC understands its political role not just in terms of policy-
relevance and policy-neutrality, but in terms of policy-performativity.
Our discussion above illustrates how scientific assessment does
not just linearly deliver facts into the political world, but rather
shapes what kinds of futures are thinkable and therefore action-
able. The link between the development of future pathways and
political choices in the present is rarely understood and requires
further exploration [49].
The heated debates about the RCP2.6 scenario are not solely a
consequence of the IPCC’s work.ii However, we would suggest
that the controversy provides an opportunity for reflecting
about the practices of scientific assessment in terms of its neutral-
ity and its role in, and implications for, climate politics.
We situate this argument within work on responsible research
and innovation, especially in wider academic calls to ‘open up’
debates about emerging technologies [51], negative emissions
[52] and options such as BECCS [53]. Responsible research and
innovation (RRI) has become a popular topic within and beyond
STS of late, with scholars engaging in debates over new technolo-
gies, such as nanotechnology, emphasizing the need for modes of
research and innovation that anticipate and take account, at an
early stage, of social, ethical and political challenges and
questions; which involve deliberation among and responsiveness
to diverse experts and stakeholders; and which are accountable
to concerned publics (e.g. [6,54]). We summarize which lessons
can be learned from experiments in applying an RRI framework
to climate engineering for the future work of the IPCC. For
this, we use the similarities between STS and RRI approaches,
which are both based on a constructivist, ‘co-productionist’
approach. Similar to work on RRI, we would draw attention to
the importance of framing effects and what RRI scholars call ‘gov-
ernance implications’ [55,56] and ‘cognitive lock-in’ to particular
options and future pathways [57].
Based on this body of emerging literature on RRI, we delineate
three implications for future IPCC assessments and the directions
that these should take.
Firstly, our case study indicates how RCP2.6 helped reinforce
the idea that the 2 °C target was still possible. RCP2.6 provided
scientific evidence for the feasibility of the 2 °C target and set
the stage for more ambitious goals to be included in the Paris
agreement (cf. Article 2.1.a). The 2 °C target seems hardly achiev-
able without BECCS according to many recent scenarios:
“it may no longer be possible to reach a goal of 450 ppm CO2eq by the end
of the century without large-scale deployment of carbon dioxide removal
technologies. […] carbon dioxide removal technologies could become
necessary in such a scenario” (p. 490 [58]) [51,59].
In the aftermath of Paris, the idea of an overshoot and the
deployment of CDR are widely agreed to be preconditions for
achieving the 2 °C target (p. xix [35]). At the same time, the
Paris agreement (cf. Article 2.1.a) has also been used to push pro-
posals for large-scale use of technologies, ranging from BECCS to
nuclear power [60].
Secondly, we have demonstrated with the RCP2.6 example in
AR5 that pathways are political interventions that shape the spec-
trum of choices in the future. The IPCC expanded the range of
scenarios and included NETs as a future mitigation option
[49,55] to staying within 2.6 W/m2. If the goal is set to 2 °C or
1.5 °C stabilization, flexibility in mitigation choices is reduced.
Virtually all of the trajectories to 2 °C or 1.5 °C stabilization
include the assumption of an overshoot. There are only a few
examples of scenarios with zero or very low levels of negative emis-
sions that are consistent with the 2 °C goal. All of these are, how-
ever, substantially more costly than scenarios that include negative
emissions [53]. The SR 1.5 °C also set the research agenda for
modelling a 1.5 °C limit [61]. For the 1.5 °C goal, almost all mod-
els predict that limiting the use of BECCS would require applying
other CO2-removal technologies or applying potentially risky solar
radiation geoengineering technologies [53]. The consequences of
these technical choices for policy-making are great [53].
According to some critics, the “mathematically nebulous
green-growth and win–win rhetoric” has set the parameters for
climate scenario building [41,20]. The idea of overshoot intro-
duced by AR5 represents a techno-economic, optimistic view of
the world that is based on the assumption that the economy is
optimizing on abatement (or GHG reduction) costs [62]. These
pre-existing commitments constrained the choice of priorities:
by setting a carbon price as a main driver of pathways, societal
priorities such as behavioural change and societal transformation
have been excluded or marginalized [49,55]. As a result, develop-
ing countries have not been given an option that is a viable alter-
native to a transition to a high-carbon society [61].iiOn the much longer history of BECCS in climate science [50].
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In their assessment of the potential of NETs, the European
Academies’ Science Advisory Council (EASAC) comes to the con-
clusion: “Relying on NETs to compensate for failures to
adequately mitigate emissions may have serious implications for
future generations” (iv [21]). Emerging research on ethical and
political aspects demonstrates how and why the overshoot vision
is not neutral but has major distributional consequences:
“The models point out how this overshoot strategy shifts the burden for
mitigation from present to future generations” (p. xix [36]).
The overshoot vision also has major political implications in
terms of historical and future responsibilities and burdens:
“the assumption of the availability of huge negative emissions later tends
to also favor the high emitting countries in the current generation since
they are required to do less in the near term” (p. xix–xx [36]).
Others have argued that ‘betting’ on BECCS as a future miti-
gation option [19] risks distracting from mitigation requirements
and difficult policy choices in the present [50]. Nordmann warns
that “an imagined future overwhelms the present” (p. 32 [63]), in
noting the inherent impossibility of anticipation as a way to know
the future in anything more than a superficial sense which, inad-
vertently, serves to reify certain futures (for a more detailed dis-
cussion and defence of this view, see pp. 39–41 [54]; for a
critique, see [14]).
The EASAC warns:
“Placing an unrealistic expectation on such technologies could thus have
irreversibly damaging consequences on future generations in the event
of them failing to deliver. This would be a moral hazard which would
be the antithesis of sustainable development” (iv [21]).
Thirdly, if BECCS remains a key part of low stabilization path-
ways and scenarios then the IPCC, if it is to retain its political
relevance, will need to be prepared to ‘get its hands dirty’ in the
politics of BECCS as a speculative mitigation solution that is not
yet available at the scale assumed in IAMs.
Since the implementation of NETs is also likely to be location-,
technology- and circumstance-specific, alternative, place-based
forms of information are relevant for policy-making on the
ground. The context-specific, socio-political preconditions for
BECCS deployment at different scales are poorly captured in cli-
mate scenarios [53]. Research into the consequences for climate
policy-making communities as well as for the possibilities of
reaching various temperature goals will be greatly needed [50].
Accounting for what we call the IPCC’s policy-performativity
– the broader, more intangible political effects of IPCC assess-
ment – may be aided by a mode of ‘responsible assessment’.iii
‘Responsible assessment’ of BECCS as a potential mitigation
solution would include a full exploration of its social and political
aspects, as called for by the early assessors of the would-be
RCP2.6 scenario [40]. This includes a systematic inclusion of
the political implications of RCP2.6, or of a widespread deploy-
ment of BECCS to meet the 2 °C or 1.5 °C target. Impacts on
land use, food security, human rights and investment costs, and
the wider politics of developing new plantations and infrastruc-
tures, have to be openly communicated to policy-makers. A future
solution-oriented IPCC may well be asked to address these gaps in
a more explicit way. Findings from RRI indicate that research on
ethical and social aspects may not necessarily undermine the sci-
entific credibility of assessments – rather it can contribute to
building trust and anticipating objections [17].
In line with RRI scholars, we suggest that the IPCC open up
and integrate a broader range of approaches when it comes to
framing and assessing the future impacts of emerging technolo-
gies – including but going beyond IAMs. The challenge is not
only about broadening the scope and scale of global assessment
[48] but also about opening up to a broader and more diverse
set of metrics, criteria and frameworks including qualitative
research on behavioural change, innovation and societal trans-
formation [64,65] to assess the policy implications of the
large-scale use of technologies such as BECCS on the ground.
This is particularly important for the assessment of potential
solutions, not least CDR or solar radiation management, which
imply important and perhaps unintended side effects.
Ex-ante assessments, based on global and top-down
approaches, tend to address simply the symptoms (such as global
radiative forcing) rather than context-specific societal drivers that
include land-use changes and their various societal implications,
impacts and risks. Bottom-up and ex-post analysis of the policy
performance of and compliance with the climate regime may
also contribute to re-evaluating and readapting policy targets.
The controversy around the use of BECCS by IAMs indicates
that there are major methodological and epistemological uncer-
tainties as well as a lack of transparency about the basic assump-
tions and feedback loops [38,39].
An uncritical use of IAMs may undermine the scientific and
political credibility of the IPCC in the long term, especially
after the publication of SR1.5. In line with RRI approaches, we
call for opening up basic assumptions on which IAMs are
based and presenting them in a transparent manner rather than
treating them as a ‘black box’, along with a critique drawing on
the most recent, available literature [66–68]. IPCC representatives
such Masson-Delmotte (AR6, WG I) have reflected that negative
emissions were included in pathways assessed in the IPCC AR5
WG III report “not in a fully transparent way” [62]. In response
to this critique, the IPCC is trying to make more transparent
the assumptions guiding the pathways, taking into account new
and emerging literature, and to make scenario data more access-
ible [62]. For the SR1.5, the IPCC seeks to include two key ele-
ments: a feasibility assessment of some of the technologies
favoured by the models, and an assessment of the enabling con-
ditions such as governance, finance, innovation and behaviour,
as compared with the rate and scale of emission decreases for
2 °C pathways [61,62].
While model-builders are very aware of the shortcomings of
their models and attempt to communicate them clearly, this often
gets lost in the chain of translation from model developer to
model (or results) user [57,69]. As such, the responsibility to
‘open up’ the models does not lie simply with the modellers, but
with the institutions and structures through which their knowl-
edge circulates and is put to work – such as the IPCC.
These dimensions are gaining in importance in the scientific
literature and thus are also taken up by the IPCC. Furthermore,
there are a variety of well-established, scientifically sound meth-
odologies applied in the field of innovation and technology assess-
ment, including RRI, which the IPCC might learn from. For
example, deliberative and multi-criteria mapping methods [70]
have been developed specifically to broaden out and open up
iiiWe use the term ‘responsible’ in the RRI sense, not to suggest that assessments in the
past have been ‘irresponsible’.
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the assessment of negative emissions in order to defuse exactly the
sorts of problems highlighted above. They also represent proactive
approaches for engaging incoming stakeholders, and mapping the
concerns and agendas that underpin their conceptions of the
future under conditions of deep uncertainty [15].
6. Conclusion
We have suggested that the politics of anticipation poses new
challenges to scientific assessments, thus necessitating new consid-
eration of the IPCC’s own role in climate politics. Accounting for
the IPCC’s policy-performativity, and engaging more directly
with putative solutions, including future, speculative and con-
tested technologies, while retaining scientific credibility and rele-
vance among various communities, may be aided by what we call
a mode of ‘responsible assessment’. Such a turn to responsible
assessment, according to RRI principles, would also contribute
to opening up the spectrum of actors, framings and options
included in the assessment, and it can contribute to making the
IPCC more responsive, accountable and credible to diverse polit-
ical communities and publics across the world.
Technologies such as BECCS would, if realizable at the scale
projected by IAMs, have major and unintended ramifications
for ambitious pathways to future climate mitigation efforts.
Taking the principle of RRI seriously, such large-scale interven-
tions need alerting to prior questions emerging from public con-
cern and democratic scrutiny, including not only the technical,
but also the political, ethical, socio-economic and distributional
implications over the course of the coming century [6]. Debates
about future mitigation pathways that will affect citizens around
the world in differentiated ways raise urgent ethical and political
questions of democratic accountability and legitimacy. A respon-
sible IPCC will need to experiment with new means of shaping
the contours and inventing the vocabularies of such debates.
The IPCC is one of the most significant acts of collective
experimentation ever undertaken in the history of science, and
its innovations and practices have shaped climate politics in pro-
found ways and have sparked other institutional attempts to solve
other global problems. That shaping has often been quite inten-
tional, in executing its mission to inform global policy-making.
At other times, we’ve suggested, it can be more tacit. By embra-
cing the full spectrum of ways in which the IPCC shapes climate
politics, the organization can continue to experiment and innov-
ate with new modes of knowledge-making, which will ensure its
continued relevance and importance to our collective experiment
with the climate system.
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